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FELA REVISITED
JERRY J. PHILLIPS*
INTRODUCTION
In 1988 I wrote an article' evaluating the effectiveness of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA or the Act)2 as a system of
deterrence and compensation for railroad injuries, as contrasted
with administrative schemes of safety regulation and compensation.
I undertook this study in response to persistent criticisms of the
FELA3 and repeated attempts on the part of the railroad industry to
have the Act repealed and replaced by a program similar to a work-
ers' compensation system.
The criticisms were that the FELA is excessively costly, slow,
unpredictable, and divisive.4 I found none of these criticisms to be
supported by the available evidence.
One interesting argument against the FELA was that the rail-
roads have become a relatively safe industry,5 so that a tort-based
system of compensation is no longer necessary to provide a safety
incentive. I found no evidence to support the argument that the
railroads are safe. I found considerable evidence to the contrary, to
support the conclusion that the railroads continue to be a hazardous
industry.6 But even if railroads have become relatively safe over the
course of the twentieth century, this trend may well be owing to the
safety incentive provided by the FELA, above and beyond the tech-
nical safety improvements otherwise effected in the industry.7 If the
safety incentive of the Act were removed, the hazardousness and in-
jury rate of railroads might well increase.
* W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A., Yale University;
M.A., Cambridge University, J.D., Yale Law School.
1. JerryJ. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 49 (1988).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
3. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 49 n.2 (citing Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mah-
shigian, The Federal Employers' Liability Act, a Bane for Workers, a Bust for Railroads, a Boon for
Lawyers, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1986); Arnold I. Havens & Anthony A. Anderson, The
Federal Employers' Liability Act: A Compensation System in Urgent NVeed of Reform, 34 FED. B.
NEWS &J. 310 (1987)).
4. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 55-61.
5. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Phillips, supra note 1, at 51-53.
7. Id. at 54.
1063
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Another objection that has been leveled against the FELA is
that it is anomalous today, when almost all other industrial accidents
in this country are compensated under workers' compensation
schemes.8 This objection has validity, however, only if no-fault
workers' compensation is superior to the FELA compensation plan:
there is, however, no persuasive evidence that it is. On the contrary,
the spiraling costs of workers' compensation schemes, the intense
politicization of the subject and structure of workers' compensation,
widespread dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of compensation
payments under workers' compensation, nagging doubts about its
efficacy as a system of deterrence, and substantial indication of wide-
spread fraud, abuse, and waste within its administration,' lead to
serious doubts not only as to whether workers' compensation is a
better system than the FELA, but whether in fact it may on balance
be a significantly worse system.
The criticisms of the FELA continue, l" and a federal committee
has undertaken an in-depth study of the question of whether the Act
should be replaced by an administrative scheme like workers' com-
pensation. ' It seemed an appropriate time, therefore, to revisit the
subject of my earlier study, to see if the conclusions in that study are
still valid. My review of the current evidence leads me to believe
that my prior conclusions remain valid and, if anything, have been
further substantiated by the passage of time. Perhaps an equally im-
portant question, then, is why the attacks upon the FELA continue.
I. THE EVIDENCE
There may be no better source of information as to the state of
affairs in the railroad industry than that provided by the industry
itself. If such information were prepared for public relations pur-
poses, its reliability would be questionable. A study by the Associa-
tion of American Railroads in 1991,2 however, was compiled for
8. Maritime employees, however, are covered under the FELA by the Merchant
Marine Act (the Jones Act). See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988).
9. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Ilorkers* Compensation: The
Recent California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983 (1993).
10. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, JVhy Congress Should Repeal The Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act of 1908, 29 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 79, 84 (1992) (arguing that "[although the societal,
industrial, and legal environments at the turn of the century warranted the enactment of
the FELA, the current societal, industrial, and legal environments do not justify the stat-
ute's continued existence").
11. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 995. Professor Schwartz is a member of the com-
mittee. Id.
12. Association of American Railroads, 1990 Report of Claim & Litigation Experi-
ence (1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter AAR Report].
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internal use and there is no reason to doubt its accuracy.
The study offers a number of revealing insights. In 1990, the
total FELA payout by railroads was $877.4 million (an eleven per-
cent increase over the previous year), representing 2.9 percent of
gross operating revenues.' 3 The study notes, however, that
"[d]espite the increase in payout the exposure base indices contin-
ued to decline. In 1990, the number of employees decreased
2.45%, total man hours worked decreased 3.56%, and miles of road
decreased 2.72%."'t
The increase in payouts from 1989 to 1990 resulted not so
much from increased lawsuits, but from an increase in payment of
claims where no lawsuit was filed. The lawsuit payout in 1990 was
$477.9 million, a seven percent increase from 1989, while the pay-
out in that year for claims not resulting in lawsuits was $399.5 mil-
lion, a seventeen percent increase from 1989.1"
The relationship between the number of lawsuits and the pay-
out amount is striking. According to the study, there were 46,901
nonlitigated claims disposed of-with or without payment-com-
pared to 5,729 disposed of after a suit had been filed. 1 6 That is to
say, while claims for which no lawsuit was filed accounted for only
about forty-six percent of the money paid out by railroads over em-
ployee injuries, they amounted to more than eighty-nine percent of
the number of all such cases. Stated the other way around, lawsuits,
which accounted in number for less than eleven percent of total
claims made, represented fifty-five percent of the total payout.
Thus, lawsuits galvanized the payout process and set the trend for
the fair value of FELA claims.
The average FELA payout for 1990, including both lawsuits and
nonlitigated claims, was $25,851. The average nonlitigated payout
in that year-not counting claims disposed of without any payment
at all-was $14,161, while the average litigated payout was
$83,419. 1' These figures illustrate the catalytic effect of lawsuit
claims on the overall payout.' 8 They also demonstrate that the
claims, whether resulting in a lawsuit or not, are on the average
modest in amount. Moreover, the average lawsuit payout dropped
by 11.19% from 1989 to 1990, and the average payout for lawsuits
13. Id. at 1-5.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2-9.
17. Id. at 2-8.
18. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 60.
1993] 1065
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
and nonlitigated claims dropped by 20.22% during the same
period. 9
If occupational illness claims-defined for purposes of this
study as hearing-loss and asbestos-injury claims20-are excluded,
the average payout figures rise significantly-to $21,954 per nonliti-
gated claim, $143,144 per lawsuit claim, and $43,750 per claim
overall. 2 1 This difference is explainable-according to the study-
by the fact that occupational-illness claims, whether litigated or not,
"have settled for far less than non-occupational cases."-22 The lion's
share of the occupational-illness claims was represented by hearing
loss as opposed to asbestos claims. In 1990, for example, approxi-
mately 30,000 hearing-loss claims were filed, as compared to about
1,200 asbestos claims for the same period.23
Thus, it can be seen that lawsuits provide an upper pressure on
the amount of FELA payouts. Also, whether the payouts are ana-
lyzed in terms of lawsuits, claims not resulting in lawsuits, all claims,
or claims not including occupational illnesses, the FELA payouts on
the average are not large compared to personal injury damages in
other contexts.24
The railroads pay significant amounts of non-FELA claims. In
1990, for example, total employee-claim payouts amounted to
$877,431,702, while railroad-crossing payouts for that year
amounted to $87,302,627, and a third category described by the
study as "miscellaneous payouts" amounted to $70,883,640.5
Thus, railroad-crossing claims equaled nearly ten percent, and mis-
cellaneous claims about eight percent, of the FELA claims. The mis-
cellaneous and crossing categories are presumably tort claims,
26
which would not be eliminated by the adoption of a workers' com-
pensation type of scheme for employee injuries. Moreover, the size
of the crossing claims illustrates the continuing hazardous nature of
railroads as a transportation industry. These crossing claims also
raise an equitable issue, suggesting that there is no reason to treat
19. See AAR Report, supra note 12, at 2-8.
20. Id. at 1-5.
21. Id. at 3-9.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3-3.
24. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 60. "[T]he railroad industry itself admits that recov-
ery of lost wages is the central issue in the majority of FELA claims, and that the total
settlement value of an FELA claim is determined primarily by the economic loss sus-
tained by the claimant." Id.
25. AAR Report, supra note 12, at 4-1.
26. It is possible that these figures also include administrative fines and contract
claims. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 52-53.
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railroad employee injuries differently from non-employee injuries.
If tort liability is the preferred method for establishing liability, it
should apply to both categories of claims.
As noted in the introduction, not all has been a bed of roses-
even from the employer perspective-in the realm of workers' com-
pensation. It is by no means clear that employers, let alone employ-
ees, would benefit from a changeover from the FELA to a no-fault
workers' compensation system in the railroad industry. The cost of
workers' compensation has been steadily and dramatically rising
during the past decade and more. 27 Workers' compensation has be-
come a politicized subject, and there is evidence of widespread
fraud, abuse, and waste in the system. 28 Moreover, a perennial con-
cern has been the undercompensation of injured employees in
workers' compensation payouts. All of these factors argue against
changing from the FELA to a workers' compensation scheme for
compensating railroad employee injuries.
A growing area of coverage for workers' compensation recovery
involves injuries resulting in mental disability. While the earlier
cases required the presence of some physical injury either causing
or resulting from the mental injury, the modern trend is to allow
compensation for pure mental injury that is shown to be job-re-
lated.29 While most courts require that the mental injury result
from a sudden, traumatic event or from extraordinary employment
stress, there is a trend-at least in California-to allow workers'
compensation recovery for pure mental injury resulting from ordi-
nary job stress, even when the employee is especially susceptible to
such injury.3°
It is evident that workers' compensation claims for pure mental
distress constitute a potential for a large increase in the number and
size of such claims in our stressful society. It is as yet unclear
whether recovery for job-related pure mental distress will be ex-
tended to FELA claims. In view of the trend toward recovery in this
regard under workers' compensation, however, it seems unlikely
that such recovery will be denied under the FELA.
27. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health-Care Plan .Iay Cover Injuries on Jobs and Roads, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1993, at Al; Employees Make Fewer Claims for Vore M1loney, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 5, 1993, at 8.
28. See generally Schwartz, supra note 9.
29. See 1B ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION § 42.21 (1991).
30. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1008. *
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II. THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY
The usual objections to the FELA-slowness, costliness, unpre-
dictability, and divisiveness-do not appear to be valid criticisms of
the Act. The basis for the attacks must therefore lie elsewhere.
Why does railroad management seek the repeal of the FELA?
It seems apparent that they believe payouts, as well as overall costs,
under a workers' compensation scheme would be significantly less
than under the FELA. It hardly seems likely that they would so vig-
orously advocate a change if they thought the cost of workers' com-
pensation would be more than the cost of FELA compensation. If
they believe that a workers' compensation scheme would, on the
whole, be more beneficial or fairer to railroad employees than the
FELA, the demonstration of this conclusion is not apparent, and
railroad management has done an exceedingly poor job in trying to
make it apparent. Moreover, management may well be incorrect in
believing that the costs of administering a workers' compensation
scheme would be less than the costs of administering the FELA, es-
pecially in view of the spiraling costs of workers' compensation.
There is some indication that railroad management believes, or
believed, that recovery for occupational illnesses would be less likely
under workers' compensation than under the FELA.3 ' If so, there
appears to be no basis for this belief. While the amount of recovery
may be less under workers' compensation than under the FELA, it is
by no means clear that the likelihood of recovery will be less under
one or the other.
It is noteworthy that railroad employees generally find the FELA
to be a satisfactory method of injury compensation. Indeed, if they
did not, the Act would have been repealed long ago and replaced by
a workers' compensation scheme, because the railroad industry has
tried repeatedly to bring about such a change, almost from the in-
ception of the FELA. It is the railroad employees, through their
union representatives, who have stood in the way of such a repeal.32
Why do railroad employees prefer to retain the FELA, rather
than switch to a workers' compensation scheme? Apparently they
believe the payouts under the FELA are on the whole more gener-
ous and fairer than they would be under a workers' compensation
administrative scheme. The evidence appears to bear them out on
this point.
31. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 54.
32. See Baker, supra note 10, at 90-92.
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The assumed virtue of a workers' compensation system is its
automatic payout, without regard to proof of employer fault. Proof
of employment causation (injury arising out of and in the course of
employment) is another matter, however, since a great deal of work-
ers' compensation claims-especially those involving occupational
diseases-are vigorously contested by employers on this point.
Under the FELA, on the other hand, the requirements for proving
both fault and causation have been attenuated, so that it is likely that
the FELA plaintiff can satisfy these elements in most of the cases
where the non-FELA plaintiff would not be able to establish liability
under a workers' compensation scheme.33 Pure comparative fault
and the liberal choice of venue rules are also features that make the
FELA an attractive remedy to railroad employees.3 4
A feature of the FELA that should be given significant weight is
its accident-deterrent effect in providing an incentive to safety. Pre-
sumably, workers' compensation liability also provides a safety in-
centive, but probably not as great an incentive as tort liability
because of the potentially greater amount of exposure under the
FELA.35 A society should act with great caution in altering an estab-
lished institution of proven workability such as the FELA, especially
where that institution provides an apparently strong safety incentive
to a hazardous activity such as the railroad industry.
CONCLUSION
The burden of proof should be on the proponents of change to
prove the desirability of change. The railroad industry has not car-
ried this burden in its efforts to obtain repeal of the FELA. The Act
provides a system of individualized justice that appears to work well.
It provides fair, and not excessive, compensation. It likely provides
a greater employer incentive to safety than workers' compensation.
As the adage goes: If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
33. Id. at 51; GUIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 32-33
(1982).
34. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 50-51.
35. See id. at 53-54.
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